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CHAPTER 2 
Consumer Law 
TERRANCE J. HAMIL TON* 
§ 2.1. Introduction. The 1976 Suroey year was ~elatively unspec-
tacular in terms of Massachusetts consumer law, both qn the judicial and 
legislative fronts. That the year did not produce many significant de-
velopments is not surprising in light of the boon df innovative con-
sumer legislation enjoyed in the late 1960s and early 1970s.1 Addi-
tionally, during the 1975 Suroey year, the Supreme Judicial Court had 
handed down two major opinions concerning the effect and scope of 
chapter 93A of the General Laws-the Consumer P~otection Act-as 
to both its public2 and private3 enforcement. In l~ght of these de-
velopments, it could be expected that subsequent opinions would not 
deviate dramatically from the established law. It ~hould be noted, 
however, that a greater number of opinions under chapter 93A were 
handed down during the 1976 Suroey year than in an~ previous year. 
§ 2.2. Stating a Cause of Action under Chapter 93A: Loss of 
Money or Property. Prior to the 1975 Suroey year, ~ery little case law 
existed under chapter 93A. However, during the 1975 Suroey year, 
the Supreme Judicial Court laid down a very solid I legal foundation 
for chapter 93A actions. In Commonwealth v. Decot1rs 1 and Slaney v. 
Westwood Auto Inc. ,2 the Court had clarified several of the procedural 
and substantive issues raised by the Commonwealth'~ Consumer Pro-
tection Act.3 During the 1976 Suroey year, the Court continued to 
flesh out the scope of the Act, and if anyone c<?nclusion can be 
drawn from the opinions, it is that the Court, while recognizing the 
I 
*TERRANCEJ. HAMILTON is Counsel for the Massachusetts Consumrs' Council. 
§2.1. 1 E.g. The Consumer Protection Act, C.L. c. 93A; Truth-in-Lending Act, C.L. 
c. 140C; Unit-Pricing Act, C.L. c. 6, § 115A; Retail Installment Sales Act, C.L. c. 255D. 
2 Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1425, 316 N.E.2d 748. For a dis-
cussion of DeCotis, see Willier, Consumer Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. r.tASS. LAW § 9.1, at 
165-71. 
3 Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 32~ N.E.2d 768. For a 
discussion of Slaney, see Willier, Consumer Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.1, at 
165-71. 
§2.2. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1425,316 N.E.2d 748. 
21975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175,322 N.E.2d 768. 
3 For a discussion of DeCotis and Slaney, see Willier, Consumer Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. 
MASS. LAW § 9.1, at 165-71. I 
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broad remedies to be applied under the Act, will only apply those re-
medies if the litigant's case fits squarely within the statutory language. 
This theme of strict statutory construction appeared in the first con-
sumer law case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 
1976 Survey year, Baldassari v. Public Finance Trust,4 in which the Court 
held that a plaintiff who had brought an action against a finance 
company for the alleged collection of debts in an "unfair, deceptive or 
unreasonable manner"5 could not recover in the absence of an actual 
loss of money or property. 6 
Baldassari arose out of allegations that Public Finance Trust in attem pt-
ing to collect its debts had, inter alia, made harassing telephone calls 
frequently at inconvenient hours, communicated with unauthorized 
third parties about its debts, including the debtor's employer, and falsely 
imprisoned one debtor. 7 A class action was brought claiming injunc-
tive relief and damages for severe emotional distress caused by the 
harassing tactics. The superior court dismissed the action, ruling that 
the plaintiffs had not met the requirements of section 9(1) of chapter 
93A of the General Laws since they had failed to allege the loss of any 
money or property.s Section 9( 1) authorizes the commencement of an 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3188, 337 N.E.2d 701. Notwithstanding that Baldassari was de-
cided during the 1976 Survey year, the case is also discussed in Willier, Consumer Law, 
1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.1, at 169, 171 and § 9.2, at 172-73. 
5 C.L. c. 93, § 49, provides that "[nlo one who is a creditor ... shall collect or attempt 
to collect Cal debt in an unfair, deceptive or unreasonable manner." 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3204, 337 N.E.2d at 709. 
7Id. at 3192-93, 337 N.E.2d at 703-04. 
8Id. at 3194, 337 N .E.2d at 705. The superior court also held: (I) that those mem-
bers of the class who had not sent demand letters under C.L. c. 93A, § 9(3) to the de-
fendant had no standing to sue individually or as representatives of a class; (2) that the 
class action was invalid since the class members were not "similarly situated" to the class 
representatives; and (3) that a substantial number of the claims were barred by the stat-
ute of limitations. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3193-94, 337 N.E.2d at 705. 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the reasoning of the lower court as to 
the demand letter and found that once a proper demand is made by one of the mem-
bers of the class "[mlultiple demands for relief need not be filed on behalf of all the 
members of the class." Id. at 3199, 337 N.E.2d at 707. The Court reasoned that to re-
quire the filing of multiple demands would serve no useful purpose and would frus-
trate the policy of discouraging the use of needless paperwork in class actions. The 
Supreme Judicial Court also rejected the superior court's holding that the members of 
the class were not "similarly situated." C.L. c. 93A, § 9(2), requires that a potential class 
demonstrate that an unfair practice "has caused similar iqiury to numerous other per-
sons similarly situated .... " The lower court reasoned that this requirement was essen-
tially the same for class actions under Rule 23 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3195-96, 337 N.E.2d at 705-06. The Supreme Judicial 
Court disagreed, noting that the adoption of Rule 23 did not restrict the requirements 
for the certification of a class action under § 9(2). In combining the two rules the Court 
found that to receive certification under § 9(2) it must be shown that the class involves 
numerous individuals, that the class representative will provide fair and adequate rep-
resentation, that there are common questions of law or fact, and that the claims of the 
representatives are typical of the class. However, a § 9(2) class action need not meet the 
Rule 23 requirements that common questions of law or fact predominate over the issues 
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action in the superior court in equity for damages and equitable relief 
by: 
Any person who purchases or leases goods, services or property, real 
or personal, primarily for personal, family or household purposes 
and thereby suffers any loss of money or property, real r personal, as a 
result of the use or employment by another person f an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice .... 9 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the plainti s argued that an 
allegation of a loss of money or property was not require since section 49 
of chapter 95 of the General Laws expressly provid s that failure to 
comply with its provisions restricting unfair debt collection techniques 
constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice under chapter 93A.I0 
The Court in dismissing this argument appeared to take the narrow view 
that while a violation of section 49 was indeed an unfair or deceptive 
practice under chapter 93A, the remedies of chapter 93A could only be 
invoked if both requirements of section 9( 1) of chapter 3A were met: (1) 
the existence of an unfair or deceptive practice (which as present); and 
(2) a loss of money or property (which was not present). The Court chose 
not to take the broader view that in enacting section 49 t e General Court 
implicitly recognized that prohibited unfair collection ractices are not 
usually of such a nature as to produce "financial harm," s is the case with 
many unfair or deceptive practices, thereby mandating resort to 93A 
remedies without the requirement of demonstrating loss of money or 
property. Such a view was rejected by the Court on the ground that it 
could not ignore "the plain language of § 9."11 
The Court then went further and strictly defined the terms "money" 
and "property." The plaintiffs attempted to argue th t a loss was sus-
tained since they were deprived of the benefit of contrac ual and statutory 
rights to protect them against harassing collection practi es and that those 
rights were property rights. They additionally asserted that loss of time 
amounted to a loss of money. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, 
concluded that in section 9(1) "money means money, ot time, and that 
property means the kind of property that is purchased or leased, not such 
of individual members and that the class action is superior to any other means of seek-
ing relief. The Court noted that § 9(2) created a "mandatory tone" toward the question 
of certifying a class action as compared to Rule 23 which allows discretion by requiring 
the judge also to decide the issues of superiority and predominatio . /d. at 3195-97, 337 
N .E.2d at 705-06. 
The Supreme Judicial Court did sustain the lower court's holdi g that a substantial 
number of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Th plaintiffs had con-
tended that the sending of the demand letter marked the com men ement of the action. 
The Court rejected this argument by referring to the requireme ts of Rule 3 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that a civil a tion is commenced 
only after a complaint and fee have been filed or mailed to th court clerk. [d. at 
3200-02, 337 N.E.2d at 707-08. 
9 G.L. c. 93A, § 9( I) (emphasis added). 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3203-04, 337 N.E.2d at 709. 
11 /d. at 3204, 337 N.E.2d at 709. 
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intangibles as a right to a sense of security, to peace of mind, or to personal 
liberty."12 
Such a strict view fails to take into account the "intangible" nature of 
consumer grievances, which is one reason that acts or practices are termed 
"unfair or deceptive." It does the consumer little real good for the Court 
to broadly define the words "unfair and deceptive" on the one hand, as it 
did in DeCotis, 13 and then turn around and narrowly circumscribe the 
remedies for unfair and deceptive practices. The Court's view fails to take 
into account the aggravation, inconvenience, and personal humiliation 
often visited upon consumers in such situations. The Supreme Judicial 
Court seemed to be somewhat mindful of this when it cited the principal 
draftsman of section 9 to the effect that "the 'sole purpose' of the re-
quirement that the plaintiff suffer loss of money or property 'is to guard 
against vicarious suits by self-constituted private attorneys general when 
they spot an apparently deceiving advertisement in the newspaper, on 
television or in a store window.' "14 It was at this point that the Court could 
have stated that since, as it had admitted, the allegations were not vicari-
ous, the sole purpose of the "money or property" clause was not being 
abridged and, therefore, the plaintiffs claims resulted in a loss recognized 
by the statute. Instead, the Court maintained its strict construction of the 
statute and rejected this approach. 
The failure of the Court to adopt a flexible interpretation of section 9 
serves as a clear warning to attorneys that some minimal loss of money or 
property must be alleged in a complaint under chapter 93A. The 
Baldassari case, in retrospect, might have come out differently had the 
plaintiffs merely alleged the loss of money due to purchase of aspirin to 
relieve headaches and pain occasioned by the defendant's harrassment. 15 
12Id. 
13 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1432, 316 N.E.2d at 754. 
14 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3205-06, 337 N.E.2d at 709, quoting Rice, New Private Rem-
ediesfor Consumers: The Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 MASS. L. Q. 307, 314 (1969). 
15 Even this solution points out the fact that a party claiming relief for extreme men-
tal suffering because of unfair or deceptive collection techniques can expect to receive 
only a narrow degree of relief from the oppressive situation. If the party can show a 
loss of money or property under § 9, a court may award injunctive relief, attorney's 
fees, related costs, and up to three times the actual damages suffered or $25, whichever 
is greater. G.L. c. 93A, §§ 9(1), (3), (4). While the mentally anguished consumer would 
under these provisions be able to prevent harassing collection practices from continuing 
and recover expenses for enlisting the aid of an attorney, there is no provision for 
punitive damages under the Consumer Protection Act. In this type of situation the 
promise of three times the cost of a bottle of aspirin holds out little encouragement to 
pursue legal action other than to obtain injunctive relief. Unless the consumer is able to 
demonstrate a significant loss of money or property, such as doctor's bills or loss of 
work, a creditor in clear violation of chapter 93A will not be substantially affected by 
the litigation. 
An additional consideration is the consumer's ability to seek relief outside of chapter 
93A. In George v.Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 255, 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1971), the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that under tort law "one who, without privilege to do so, 
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally causes severe emotional distress to 
another, with bodily harm resulting from such distress, is subject to liability .... " Id. (em-
4
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§2.3. Reasonable Offer of Settlement: Attorney's Fees. The Su-
preme Judicial Court's adherence to a principle of st ict statutory con-
struction of chapter 93A was clearly illustrated during the Survey year 
in the Court's opinion in Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc. 1 The Kohl case 
might be described as a highly representative consuf-er law case, and 
as the type of case most likely contemplated by t e General Court 
when it enacted chapter 93A. The fact that in Koh chapter 93A al-
[ most served the purposes for which it was writte , but in the end failed to do so, points up the need for the Legislature to take another 
look at the statute and undertake some amendatory action. 
The Kohl case concerned the purchase of an autoibile, a consumer 
good that continues to create more consumer complai ts than any other 
single product or service. The plaintiff alleged that he car dealer had 
engaged in unfair and deceptive practices, which practices included the 
substitution, without notice, of a different car lacking certain optional 
features, replacement of the original defective autolatic transmission, 
and excessively frequent and extensive, but unsuccessf I repairs.2 After a 
few months of what can be imagined as extreme frust tion, the plaintiff 
sent a written demand for relief! to the seller, demanding, inter alia, an 
phasis added). A mere showing of extreme emotional distress is ~ot adequate to state a 
cause of action under this requirement. There must be an additi nal showing of bodily 
harm. Based upon these criteria, the plaintiffs in Baldassari woul also be denied a re-
covery in tort, since their only claim was for extreme emotion I distress without any 
mention of bodily injury. 
In effect the plaintiffs in Baldassari were left without any means of recovering dam-
ages from actions which, if true, were "clear, serious and continuing violations of G.L. 
c. 93, § 49 .... " 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3189, 337 N.E.2d at 703. It was for this reason 
that the Court in Baldassari noted that the result in "this case it not entirely satisfac-
tory." [d. 
It should be noted that despite the language of the Court in Ge rge mentioned above, 
the Court in that case went on to reserve the question of whether "allegations of dis-
tress without resulting bodily injury" are sufficient to state a cause of action in tort. 359 
Mass. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. This question was answered in Agis v. Howard John-
son Co., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2346, 355 N.E.2d 315, a case dec~.ded after the close of 
the 1976 Survey year. In Agis, the Court expanded its reasonin in George by stating 
"that one who, by extreme and outrageous conduct and without rivilege, causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such e otional distress even 
though no bodily harm may result." [d. at 2351,355 N.E.2d at 318. It now appears that 
plaintiffs such as the Baldassari's may bring an action in tort for damages without a 
showing of bodily harm. However, Agis has no effect on the Court's holding in 
Baldassari, since that case dealt with the necessity of alleging a IlsS of money or prop-
erty under chapter 93A. 
§2.3. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 560, 343 N.E.2d 375. 
2 [d. at 561-62, 343 N.E.2d at 377. 
3 The requirements for a proper demand for relief are stated in G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3): 
At least thirty days prior to the filing of [an action under chapter 93A], a written 
demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably desci·bing the unfair or 
deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, sh I be mailed or de-
livered to any prospective respondent. Any person receiving su h a demand for re-
lief who, within thirty days of the mailing or delivery of the demand for relief, 
makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any 
5
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entire refund of the purchase price and damages in the amount of 
$1,934.38, including attorney's fees to date. 4 The seller, Silver Lake, 
responded with a written tender of settlement offering three options: (1) 
replacement; (2) full credit toward a new 1974 Dodge of the plaintiffs 
choice; or (3) refund.s None of these options included a settlement of 
attorney's fees or damages for the defective operation of the automobile. 
The plaintiff rejected the settlement offer and commenced suit. In the 
superior court, the trial judge found the car dealer's written tender of 
settlement to be "reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by 
the ... [buyer]."6 This finding effectively limited the buyer's recovery in 
the action to the relief tendered by the seller in response to the buyer's 
demand letter. Such a result is mandated by section 9(3) of chapter 93A, 
which provides in part that: 
Any person receiving ... a demand for relief who, within thirty days 
of the mailing or delivery of the demand for relief, makes a written 
tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any 
subsequent action, file the written tender and an affidavit concerning 
its rejection and thereby limit any recovery to the relief tendered if the court 
finds that the relief was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by 
the petitioner. 7 
The superior court went on to rule that the substitution of cars by Silver 
Lake was a violation of section 2(a) of chapter 93A of the General Laws.s 
However, since the court also found that the substitution was neither 
willful nor knowing, it limited the award of damages to $500 and allowed 
the buyer only $250 as reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred on or 
before the date of the letter tending the offer of settlement.9 The court 
also ruled that the replacement of the original, defective transmission was 
not a violation of chapter 93A, and that the unsatisfactory performance of 
subsequent action, file the written tender and an affidavit concerning its rejection 
and thereby limit any recovery to the relief tendered if the court finds that the re-
lief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by the 
petitioner. In all other cases, if the court finds for the petitioner, recovery shall be 
in the amount of actual damages or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater; or up 
to three but not less than two times such amount if the court finds that the use or 
employment of the act or practice was willful or knowing violation of said section 
two or that the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith with 
knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated said 
section two. In addition, the court shall award such other equitable relief, includ-
ing an injunction, as it deems to be necessary and proper. The demand require-
ments of this paragraph shall not apply if the prospective respondent does not 
maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth, but 
such respondent may otherwise employ the provisions of this section by making a 
written offer of relief and paying the rejected tender into court as soon as practicable 
after receiving notice of an action commenced under this section. 
4 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 563 n.2, 343 N.E.2d at 377 n.2. 
5/d. at 563-64 n.3, 343 N.E.2d at 377-78 n.3. 
6Id. at 564, 343 N.E.2d at 377. 
7 C.L. c. 93A, § 9(3) (emphasis added). 
8 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 564, 343 N.E.2d at 378. 
9Id. 
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the vehicle was a breach of contract but not a violatiotn of chapter 93A.10 
The court assessed damages of $300 for breach of ontractY 
The buyer on direct appellate review to the Sup erne Judicial Court 
argued that the trial court was wrong as a matter of law in ruling that 
the relief tendered was "reasonable in relation tOl the i~ury actually 
suffered."12 This argument related in particular fO the question of 
whether a reasonable offer of settlement should have included damages 
for the defective operation of the automobile as well as attorney's fees. 13 
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Supteme Judicial Court 
held that the damages suffered because of the de~ective transmission 
were not attributable to the seller's violation of chapter 93A and therefore 
did not have to be included in a settlement in response to a demand letter 
under that chapter.14 The Court also found that attorhey's fees were not a 
part of the "injury actually suffered by the petitionJr ."15 
The prime significance of Kohl is that the case established guidelines for 
determining what constitutes a reasonable offer 1 settlement under 
chapter 93A. The Kohl Court first noted that the injur suffered-the loss 
of money or property-must be related to th seller's deceptive 
practices. 16 After examining the language of section 9( 1) of chapter 93A, 
the Cou:t found that the provision in~icated "that thfre must be a ca~sal 
connectIOn between the seller's deceptIOn and the burer's loss."17 In lIght 
of such a finding, the Court went on to state that only those losses 
sustained by a buyer which are the foreseeable consequences of a seller's 
deception should be recoverable. IS Under this reasqning, the Supreme 
Judicial Court seemingly applied a tort standard to the ascertainment of 
damages in a consumer transaction. 19 Its immediate effect in the Kohl case 
10 [d. Compare the lower court's finding in Kohl with respect to the unsatisfactory per-
formance issue with Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 195-97, 
322 N.E.2d 768, 778, where the Supreme Judicial Court found that a failure to fulfill 
warranty obligations gave rise to a C.L. c. 93A, § 9 claim for relijf. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 564,343 N.E.2d at 378. 
12 [d. at 564-65, 343 N.E.2d at 378. 
13 C.L. c. 93A, § 9(3), states that if the court finds that the relief tendered in response 
to the demand letter is "reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered," the 
petitioner will be limited to only a recovery of the relief tendereU as settlement. Section 
9(3) is quoted in the text at note 7 supra. Since the tender of set~lement in Kohl did not 
include damages for defective operation of the car or attorney's fees, see text at note 5 
supra, the petitioner argued that this was not a reasonable offer and, hence, he was not 
limited to the tender of settlement in seeking relief. I 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 566-67, 343 N.E.2d at 379. 
15 [d. at 568, 343 N.E.2d at 379. 
16 [d. at 566-67, 343 N.E.2d at 379. 
17 [d. at 567, 343 N.E.2d at 379. 
18 [d. The Court also stated that "[a] seller who violates C.~. c. 93A, § 2, is not 
thereby a guarantor against defects in the item sold which are ~nrelated to the decep-
tive act or practice." [d. 
1. Compare id. with Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175,199,322 
N.E.2d 768, 779, where the Court examined in great detail theJbackground of C.L. c. 
93A, and concluded: "The § 9 claim for relief is the creation of hat statute. It is, there-
fore, sui generis. It is neither wholly tortious nor wholly contr ctual in nature, and is 
7
Hamilton: Chapter 2: Consumer Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
§2.3 CONSUMER LAW 35 
was to remove from the consideration of the reasonableness of the offer 
of settlement the element of any damages occasioned by the defective 
transmission, since those damages were not causally related to the decep-
tive practices of the seller. The Court noted that the seller was not 
attempting to deceive the buyer as to the defective transmission, especially 
since the seller had replaced the first transmission. The Court concluded 
that even though the car was still defective after the repairs, such a 
circumstance did not constitute an "unfair or deceptive act or practice."20 
In considering whether attorney's fees should be a required element of 
an offer of settlement, the Court stated: 
In measuring the reasonableness of a tender of settlement 
under § 9(3) the judge should not treat attorney's fees as part of 
the "injury actually suffered by the petitioner." Counsel fees gen-
erally are not recoverable in this Commonwealth in the absence of 
statutory authorization .... We are unaware of any instance where 
the words "injury" or "injury actually suffered" have been used by 
our Legislature to include counsel fees. The reference in § 9(3) to 
"injury actually suffered" is no different. Counsel fees are covered 
explicitly by the language in § 9(4) .... If "injury actually suf-
fered" included counsel fees, there would have been no need to 
make separate provision for the recovery of counsel fees. 21 
The effect of the Supreme Judicial Court's holding with respect to 
attorney's fees raises the following question: If judges cannot treat 
attorney's fees as part of the "injury actually suffered" in measuring 
the reasonableness of a tender of settlement, to what extent will mer-
chants disregard a consumer's demand for attorney's fees when ten-
dering a settlement? Consumer advocates should be apprehensive that 
Kohl will encourage businessmen to refuse to reimburse consumers for 
attorney's fees. At the present time, many attorneys include a demand 
for attorney's fees when sending a demand letter on behalf of a client. 
If an attorney has expended time interviewing a client, conducting an 
initial investigation of law and fact, and drafting a demand letter, it is 
appropriate and reasonable that a demand for counsel fees be made. 
However, the exclusion of counsel fees from consideration of the 
reasonableness of a tender of settlement under Kohl seems incongru-
ous with the ruling that attorney's fees are recoverable only if suit has 
been brought under section 9(4). A situation may now develop where 
a party could decide that an offer of settlement is reasonable, except 
that the demand for counsel fees has been rejected. Such a party 
would now be forced into commencing suit in order to re<;;over coun-
sel fees incurred to the date of the offer of settlement pursuant to 
not subject to the traditional limitation of preexisting causes of action such as tort for 
fraud and deceit." Id. 
20 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 567, 343 N.E.2d at 379. 
21Id. at 568, 343 N.E.2d at 379. 
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section 9(4) of chapter 93A of the General Laws.22 
This was clearly not the intent of section 9. It is virtually indisput-
able that the dollar amount of most individual consumer transactions, 
as well as the dollar amount of losses generated by unfair or deceptive 
practices in such transactions, are relatively small. A attorney and his 
client cannot afford to undertake serious litigation when the costs of 
such litigation will far outstrip any recoverable dam ges. The "written 
demand for relief' required by section 9(3) is a cl ar attempt to re-
solve many consumer complaints before litigation ecomes necessary. 
However, the situation that now exists is that atto neys will become 
even less willing to provide counsel for consumers if efforts on their 
client's behalf will be completely unrewarded. Some minimal compen-
sation, proportional to the actual damages involved, would not only 
pay for the legal work involved, but would foster the legislative goal 
of settling private consumer complaints in a fair and expeditious 
manner.23 Even the Supreme Judicial Court has n ted that the con-
sideration of attorney's fees in such circumstances as "not without its 
appeal as a matter of legislative policy, at least if the maximum 
amount of the attorney's fees is limited by some obj ctive standard."24 
It will be interesting to see if the General Court w II act on this sug-
gestion of the Supreme Judicial Court . 
. The final question ruled on by the Court in Kohl stemmed from the. 
buyer's contention that the acts of the seller were "willful and know-
ing" violations of section 2, which under section 9(3) of chapter 93A 
would entitle the buyer to "three but not less than two times" his ac-
tual damages. 25 Section 9(3) serves as a strong incentive for claim set-
tlements on the part of merchants26 by providin that a consumer 
may receive double or treble damages "if the court finds that the use 
or employment of the act or practice was a willful 0 knowing violation 
of ... section two .... 27 In rejecting the petition r's argument, the 
Court stated: 
Section 9(3) does not grant an injured party s ch relief if the 
injured party has rejected a reasonable offer of settlement made in 
accordance with the requirements of § 9(3). After providing for a 
limitation on recoverable damages in a case in which the judge finds 
an offer of settlement to be reasonable in relation to the i~ury 
actually suffered, § 9(3) then states what damages are recoverable 
"[i]n all other cases." Among those damages "[i]n al other cases" are 
double to triple damages when the violation of 2 is willful or 
knowing. Thus, plainly, the statute contemplates tha even a willful or 
22 See Acts of 1976, c. 233, which provides for the allocation counsel fees and ex-
penses in civil cases. 
23See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 181-93,322 N.E.2d 
768, 772-77. 
24 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 568-69,343 N.E.2d at 379. 
251d. at 570, 343 N.E.2d at 380. 
26 See id. at 571 n.7, 343 N.E.2d at 380 n.7. 
27 C.L. C. 93A, § 9(3) (emphasis added). 
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knowing violator of § 2 may limit his maximum potential damages by 
making a reasonable offer of settlement. 28 
37 
Clearly then, since the Court had found Silver Lake's offer of settlement 
reasonable, the plaintiff, though injured, could not have recourse to the 
remedy of double or treble damages. Therefore, defendants in cases 
similar to Kohl can protect themselves from such damages by making a 
good faith offer of settlement. 
§ 2.4. Landlord-Tenant: Demand Letter: Failure to Disclose 
Relevant Facts. York v. Sullivan! is a straightforward case establishing 
and refining the procedures to be followed under chapter 93A. As in 
Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc.,2 questions concerning the demand let-
ter required by section 9(3) of chapter 93A of the General Laws were 
presented, but were here resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. 3 The 
plaintiffs in York were tenants in a federally assisted housing 
development. 4 Each tenant had executed a one-year lease which pro-
vided that the monthly rent was subject to adjustments approved by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). How-
ever, at the time the leases were executed, the landlords failed to in-
form the tenants that an application for an increase was pending.5 
Subsequently, during the term of the tenancy, HUD approved the 
rent increases. Thereafter, the landlords informed the tenants that an 
increase had been approved. Several weeks later the plaintiffs sent a 
demand letter to the landlords, asserting that the respondents' failure 
to inform the tenants of the pending rent increases violated Regula-
tion XV-B of the Attorney General's Rules and Regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to section 2(c) of chapter 93A. Regulation XV-B 
states that it is a violation of chapter 93A if "[a]ny person ... fails to 
disclose to a buyer or a prospective buyer any fact, the disclosure of 
which may have influenced the buyer or prospective buyer not to 
enter into the transaction." The landlords in replying to the demand 
letter refused to give any relief.6 A few days later the plaintiffs filed a 
28 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 571, 343 N.E.2d at 380. 
§2.4. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3379, 338 N.E.2d 341. 
2 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 560, 343 N.E.2d 375. For a further discussion of Kohl, see §2.3 
supra. 
3 In addition, York is a fairly typical chapter 93A case, in that it involved a failure to 
disclose relevant facts. It should be noted that the deception and unfairness occasioned 
by buyers or lessees in consumer transactions is frequently caused not by what a seller 
or lessor did or said, but by what hefailed to do or say. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3380,338 N.E.2d at 344. 
5Id. at 3382. 338 N.E.2d at 345. 
6Id. at 3381, 338 N.E.2d at 344. At a subsequent preliminary hearing, "the defend-
ants agreed that any tenant could cancel his lease without penalty rather than pay the 
increased rent and that no tenant would be evicted until a decision was made by the 
court." Id. at 3381-82, 338 N.E.2d at 344. In dismissing the action, the trial court found 
that the stipulation was a reasonable tender of settlement under G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3). 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3382-83, 338 N.E.2d at 345. On appeal the Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed the lower court's holding. The Court noted that besides the fact that the 
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bill in equity challenging the rent increase on equit ble grounds sepa-
rate and distinct from any chapter 93A claim. ubsequently, the 
equitable action was consolidated with a second acti n brought under 
chapter 93A.7 
At trial the only factual issue was whether the les ees had been ad-
vised at the time of signing their leases that an ap lication for a rent 
increase had been pending before HUn.8 The plai tiffs testified and 
the judge ruled that plaintiffs "were not advised wh n they signed the 
leases that an application for rent adjustment wa then pending."9 
However, the judge ruled that the tenants were ob igated to pay the 
increase, and dismissed the chapter 93A action.1 The trial judge 
based the dismissal in part on the finding that the emand letter did 
not reasonably describe the act in question and th t by bringing the 
bill in equity during the 30 days following the d mand letter, the 
plaintiffs waived their chapter 93A rightsY The laintiffs appealed 
the dismissal, thereby giving the Supreme Judicial Court the oppor-
tunity to further clarify important procedural aspect of the statute. 
Section 3( l)(a) of chapter 93A exempts transaction from its applica-
tion to the extent that such "actions are otherwise perm'tted under laws as 
administered by any regulatory board or officer acti g under statutory 
authority ofthe commonwealth or of the United States "12 On appeal, the 
defendants contended that the statutory exemption ap lied to them. The 
Court found that their failure to raise the issue in the r pleadings below 
prevented raising it on appea1. 13 The Court also not d in passing that 
there was no showing that Hun regulated unfair or de eptive practices. 14 
It is therefore likely that even if the statutory exempt"on argument had 
been raised at trial, such exemption was probably not a ailable. It appears 
that the mere fact that a business or occupation is subj ct to some regula-
tion is not enough in itself to qualify for the statutory ex mption of section 
3( l)(a). The exemption will apply only where it can e shown that the 
particular activity in question is subject to regulations relating to unfair 
defendants had failed to follow the procedures of § 9(3) in maki g the offer, the offer 
itself was not reasonable. Under the defendants' stipulation, a t nant could either ter-
minate the lease, refuse to pay the rent increase but risk evicti n if he or she lost in 
court, or pay the rent increase. The Court concluded that the e choices were not a 
reasonable settlement and found: "Where the unlawful deceptive practice of a landlord 
leads a tenant to believe that the rent under a lease will be sta Ie during its one-year 
term, the tenant is entitled to the benefit of the bargain the la dlord induced him to 
think he was making." Id. at 3389, 338 N.E.2d at 347. 
7Id. at 3381-82, 338 N.E.2d at 344. 
"Id. at 3382, 338 N.E.2d at 344. 
9 Id., 338 N.E.2d at 345. 
10ld. at 3382-83, 338 N.E.2d at 345. 
"Id. See note 6 supra. 
12 G.L. c. 93A, § 3(l)(a). 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3383, 338 N.E.2d at 345. The Court Iso found that the de-
fendants had the burden of showing the availability of the exemp ion. Id. 
I<Id. 
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and deceptive practices. 15 
As in Kohl, the Court in York also had the opportunity to rule on issues 
concerning the demand letter required by section 9(3) of chapter 93A.16 
Section 9(3) requires, inter alia, that the demand letter reasonably describe 
the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon. The trial judge had 
found that the defendants' failure to advise the tenants of the pending 
HUD application was the only act or practice "colorably a violation" of 
chapter 93A, but that the plaintiffs' written demand for relief had not 
mentioned that act or practiceP Accordingly, the trial court ruled that 
the demand letter did not meet the requirements of section 9(3).18 The 
letter had, however, claimed that the tenants had been deceived as to the 
stability of their rent levels, and the defendants' response showed that 
they had understood the nature of the grievance. Therefore, the Court 
held that the demand letter was sufficient, since it had fulfilled the two 
major purposes of a demand letter: (1) it had given the defendants an 
opportunity to review both facts and law in order to ascertain whether 
the relief requested was justified, and (2) it had enabled them to make 
a reasonable offer of settlement. 19 
A major concern of attorneys drafting demand letters is the degree 
of specificity required in a written demand for relief. A major prob-
lem in cases similar to York is that the act or practice is often difficult 
to describe with a high degree of specificity since it involves the fail-
ure of the respondent to disclose a relevant fact. 20 It now seems clear 
that in such cases, as long as the general nature of the grievance is de-
scribed, a court will not require exact specificity. As the Court in York 
stated: "We do not think [the defendants] could insist that the plain-
tiffs inform them of facts they had deceptively failed to disclose. In-
15 It should be noted that HUD regulations do require that a landlord give tenants 
notice of the application for a rent increase by posting a notice 30 days before filing the 
request. 24 C.F.R. § 410 (1976), amended and recodified as 24 C.F.R. § 861, 41 Fed. Reg. 
15845-46 (April 15, 1976). However, there is no provision in the regulation for direct 
notice to new tenants who sign leases during the notification period. It could be argued 
that the landlords' assumed observance of HUD's notification procedures constituted, 
under § 3( l)(a), an action "permitted under laws as administered by [al regulatory 
board ... acting under statutory authority ... of the United States." Hence, while the 
landlords did not give specific notice to the plaintiffs, their actions were in keeping with 
the HUD notice procedures. In stating that "[tlhere is no showing that HUD regulates 
unfair or deceptive failure to disclose material facts to prospective tenants," 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 3383, 338 N.E.2d at 345, the Court was apparently giving a limited in-
terpretation to § 3( 1)(a) by including within its scope only those statutory schemes that 
specifically limit unfair and deceptive practices. 
16 G.L. C. 93A, § 9(3), provides in part that "[a]t least thirty days prior to the filing of 
[an action under § 9( 1)1, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and 
reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury 
suffered, shall be mailed or delivered to any prospective respondent." 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3383-84,338 N.E.2d at 345. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 3385, 338 N.E.2d at 346. 
20 See note 3 supra. 
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formation which serves no useful purpose is not required."21 How-
ever, the Court indicated that where a consumer kn~ws what has been 
disclosed and can ascertain whether there has been compliance with 
laws governing the disclosure, a demand letter will be held insufficient 
if such practices are not accurately described.22 
The Supreme Judicial Court also considered the tial judge's ruling 
that the plaintiffs had waived their chapter 93A emedies. Section 
9(3)(a) of chapter 93A provides that the demand letter must be 
mailed or delivered at least 30 days prior to the qling of an action 
under section 9(1).23 In York, the plaintiffs had irtstituted a suit in 
equity on grounds independent of chapter 93A only eleven days after 
sending the demand letter. It was not until 39 days later that an ac-
tion was brought under chapter 93A.24 The trial ijudge had found 
that the institution of the first action within the 30 qay limit served as 
a waiver of the right to bring the second action. 25 In overturning this 
holding,26 the Supreme Judicial Court found that the 30 day limit 
does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking relief outside of chapter 
93A. The Court also noted that even if the first· action could be 
considered as based upon chapter 93A, it would not be a bar to a sec-
ond action brought after the 30 day limit and bas1d upon the same 
statute.27 
§2.5. Mobile Home Statutes: Constitutionality. n 1973 the Gen-
eral Court enacted several major changes in the statutes governing the 
management of mobile home parks.1 This legislatiop was in response 
to a number of complaints received by the Attorney I General concern-
ing abuses in the unique relationship that exists between mobile home 
park owners and their tenants. Unlike normal landlord-tenant rela-
tionships, a typical mobile home park tenant owns ~is or her mobile 
home, but rents the lot on which the home itself is Isituated from the 
park owner. This relationship may lead to a conflict between the two 
ownership interests. For example, the tenant in selling his mobile 
home may care little about the qualifications of tht future buyer as 
211d. at 3386, 338 N.E.2d at 346. 
221d. at 3385, 338 N.E.2d at 346. See Entriaglo v. Twin City Dtdge, Inc., 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2650, 333 N.E.2d 202, 203-04. 
23 See note 16 supra. 
24 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3381-82, 338 N.E.2d at 344. 
25 /d. at 3386, 338 N .E.2d at 346. ~ 
26 At trial the defendants had not raised the issue of waiver. Nonetheless, the trial 
judge found that the plaintiffs had waived their rights.ld. The S preme Judicial Court 
noted that it is not "open to the judge to raise the point [of waiver 1 on his own motion 
after trial and long after the thirty days have expired." Id. The Court clearly implied 
that the burden was on the defendants to allege and prove the tssue. In addition, the 
defendants, if they were unduly hurried by the first action, could have requested plain-
tiffs' counsel or the court to stay the proceedings.ld. at 3386-87, 38 N.E.2d at 346. 
271d. at 3387-88, 338 N.E.2d at 347. 
§2.5. I Acts of 1973, c. 1007. See G.L. c. 140, §§ 32j-Q. 
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long as the sale price is paid. On the other hand, the park owner may 
be extremely interested in the qualifications of the buyer, since the 
buyer may ultimately become a tenant. For this reason, the park 
owner may enforce certain restrictions on the sale of mobile homes by 
tenants to insure some control over the selection of future tenants. 
The purpose of the 1973 legislation was in part to protect tenants 
from regulations by park owners that unnecessarily interfered with 
the tenants' enjoyment of their property. The legislation included 
limitations on the right of the park owner to evict a tenant,2 
"unreasonable, unfair, or unconscionable" rules by a park owner gov-
erning the rental, occupancy, or sale of mobile homes,3 and reprisals 
against tenants for reporting violations. 4 The statute also included a 
set of required disclosures that a park owner must make to his or her 
tenants. 5 The constitutionality of the 1973 mobile home legislation' 
was brought into question during the Survey year in Commonwealth v. 
Gustafsson. 6 
Gustafsson arose when the Attorney General commenced an action 
for declaratory and injunctive relief against a mobile home park 
owner who was allegedly violating the mobile home statute. To con-
trol the sale of mobile homes on his property, the owner had insti-
tuted a set of rules prohibiting tenants from displaying "For Sale" 
signs outside their mobile homes. 7 The owner then placed a sign at 
the entrance of the park directing all prospective buyers to first go to 
the park owner's office.s The park rules also contained a provision 
that "[m]anagement recognizes a tenant's right to sell his mobile home 
on the lot, if current legislation is upheld in the CourtS."9 The Attor-
ney General claimed that these actions were in violation of the mobile 
home statutes, because they interfered with the tenant's right to sell 
his or her home. 10 The superior court judge found that these actions 
did not violate the mobile home statutes, and that certain sections of 
the statute were unconstitutionalY On direct app~llate review to the 
2 G.L. c. 140, § 32j, as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 1007, § I. Section 32] was 
again amended by Acts of 1975, c. 692. 
3 G.L. c. 140, §§ 32L, 32M, as added by Acts of 1973, c. 1007, § 2. See notes 13 and 23 
infra. 
• G.L. c. 140, § 32N, as added by Acts of 1973, c. 1007, § 2. 
5 G.L. c. 140, § 32P, as added by Acts of 1973, c. 1007, § 2. 
6 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1073, 346 N.E.2d 706. 
7Id. at 1077,346 N.E.2d at 709. 
BId. 
old. at 1089,346 N.E.2d at 713. 
,old. at 1077-78,346 N.E.2d at 709-10. 
11 Id. at 1074-75, 346 N.E.2d at 708-09. The trial judge had ruled that G.L. c. 140, § 
32j, as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 1007, § I, which pertains to evictions, and § 
32P, which concerns notice requirements, were unconstitutional. On appeal the Su-
preme judicial Court vacated this holding, finding that 'hJhese sections are not mate-
rial to the instant case, and we need not consider their constitutionality in order to de-
termine the rights of the parties." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1078-79, 346 N.E.2d at 710. 
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Supreme Judicial Court, the Court reversed in part and affirmed in 
part the holding of the lower court. 12 Specifically, the Court found 
that clauses (1) and (6) of section 32L of chapter 140 of the General 
Laws, which section governs mobile home park rules,13 and section 
32M of chapter 140, which section pertains to unfair and deceptive 
trade practices in the sale of mobile homes,14 were constitutional.15 
The Court also held that the restriction against "For ale" signs was a 
violation of section 32L(1) of chapter 140.16 
The initial question facing the Court in Gustafsson s to the constitu-
tionality of the mobile homes statute was to what ext nt may the state 
regulate a business entity in the interest of consume protection. The 
Court's answer, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Hennessey, was 
that within the bounds of due process, the state may regulate fairly 
extensively. 17 
On appeal before the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant had 
argued that subsections (1) and (6) of section 32U8 were "so indefi-
nite and vague as to offend the due process clause.'!9 These subsec-
tions basically require that any rule promulgated b a mobile home 
park owner may not be "unreasonable," "unfair," "un onscionable," or 
"deceptive."20 In rejecting the defendant's argument that these terms 
were indefinite and vague, the Supreme Judicial Cou t stated: 
We note initially that the due process clause does not require 
great exactitude of statutes which regulate business activities .... 
Regulation of trade practices must be in broad terms in order to 
prevent circumvention of statutory purposes by "new and ingenious 
ways that were unknown when the [statute was] enacted." There-
fore, the meaning and application of terms must e arrived at by 
... "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and e clusion."21 
Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Judicial Co rt found that a 
trial court in interpreting the subsections in question could utilize sev-
eral methods of interpretation, such as considerati n of the abuses 
sought to be remedied by the statute or other statut s employing the 
same language, to reach a standard "sufficiently definite to satisfy the 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1073,346 N.E.2d 706. 
13 G.L. c. 140, §§ 32L(l), (6). Section 32L(l) states that "[al mobile home park licensee 
may promulgate rules governing the rental or occupancy of a mobile home lot but no 
such rule shall be unreasonable, unfair, or unconscionable." sec!.on 32L(6) provides 
that "[alny rule or condition of occupancy which is unfair and dec ptive or which does 
not conform to the requirements of this section shall be unenforce ble." 
14 G.L. c. 140, § 32M. This section is quoted at note 23 infra. 
15 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1079-86,346 N.E.2d at 710-12. 
16Id. at 1086-88,346 N.E.2d at 712-13. 
17Id. at 1081,346 N.E.2d at 711. 
18 G.L. c. 140, §§ 32L(l), (6). The subsections are quoted at note 13 supra. 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1080,346 N.E.2d at 710. 
20 G.L. c. 140, §§ 32L(l), (6). These subsections are quoted at note 13 supra. 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1081,346 N.E.2d at 711 (citations omitted). 
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due process clause."22 Hence, subsections (1) and (6) of section 32L 
were deemed not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite. 
The Court next turned to the question of the constitutionality of 
section 32M of chapter 140 of the General Laws,23 which section pre-
vents a mobile home park owner from denying entrance to a potential 
home buyer, if the buyer meets the current rules of the park. The 
superior court had found that section 32M denies a mobile home 
park owner any discretion in choosing future tenants and was there-
fore unconstitutional. 24 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the 
lower court's holding, since the section does provide that the park 
22 [d. at 1081-82, 346 N.E.2d at 711. The Court employed the same approach as it 
had utilized earlier in Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1425, 1432,316 
N.E.2d 748, 754, in stating: "Although the words 'unfair,' 'unreasonable,' 'unconscion-
able,' and 'deceptive' may appear to lack specificity if considered in the abstract, we be-
lieve that their meaning may be determined from the circumstances of each case." 1976 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1081-82,346 N.E.2d at 711. For a discussion of DeCotis, see Willier, 
Consumer Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.1, at 165-71. 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court handed down its first decision concerning an 
interpretation of an "unfair or deceptive ... practice" under chapter 93A. In Donnelly v. 
Suffolk Univ., 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1342, 1342, 337 N.E.2d 920, 921, the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant gave positive weight to law school applicants who 
received favorable recommendations from the school's "alumni, students and friends." 
The plaintiff claimed that this practice was unfair or deceptive in light of language in 
the law school catalog, which catalog stated: 
The admissions committee does not use a minimum cut-off system in evaluating an 
applicant's grade-point average or LSA T score. Rather, the committee chooses to 
evaluate each applicant's potential ... by studying all relevant evidence brought to 
the committee's attention. This includes but is not limited to evaluation of the fol-
lowing: improvement in college grades, ... employment experience, demonstrated 
leadership ability, motivation for the study of law and letters of recommendation. 
[d. Without explaining further, the Appeals Court simply stated: 
As such a policy, if proved, would not constitute an unfair or deceptive practice, the 
complaint cannot be said to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted," and 
the motion to dismiss was properly sustained on the basis of the second ground 
therein stated .... Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ... a complaint must show not merely 
a grievance but a violation of a legal right which belongs to the plaintiff, and which 
the defendant has breached. 
Jd. (citations omitted). It is submitted that the practice complained of was found not to 
be unfair or deceptive because the phrase "letters of recommendation" was sufficiently 
broad to include the pratice plaintiff complained of: that positive weight would be given 
to applicants who received favorable recommendations from "alumni, students and 
friends." Although the mere fact that a practice is disclosed, i.e., a consumer is made 
aware of it so that failure to disclose relevant facts cannot be alleged, the practice is not 
usually by itself sufficient to prevent it from being found unfair or deceptive. The fact 
that the practice was not an unconscionable one probably influenced the court's ruling. 
23 C.L. C. 140, § 32M, provides in part: 
Upon the sale or proposed sale of a mobile home located on a lot in a mobile 
home park and which is not owned by the mobile home park licensee, the prospec-
tive purchaser and members of his household may not be refused entrance if they 
meet the current rules of the park. 
24 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1082-83,346 N.E.2d at 711-12. 
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owner may use reasonable discretion.25 Under the mobile home stat-
ute a park owner may exert control by enacting reasonable park rules 
and by evicting tenants who violate those rules.26 The Court, there-
fore, found that section 32M was not unconstitutional insofar as it 
forces a park owner to accept a new tenant again t his or her will, 
since the park owner retains the power to "pro ulgate reasonable 
rules and regulations and thereby exercise control s to the qualifica-
tions for prospective tenants."27 
Having found sections 32L and 32M constitution 1, the Court then 
considered whether the actions of the park owner in Gustafsson vio-
lated the mobile home statute. The Court approached the issue of the 
owner's restriction against "For Sale" signs by weighing the fact that 
such signs detracted from the appearance of the park against the im-
portance of the tenant's right to sell his mobile home. 28 On balance 
the Court found that because of the scarcity of land for mobile homes 
"a tenant's right to sell his home on his lot is of substantial impor-
tance, and the statute may properly forbid a park 0lner from restrict-
ing this right unnecessarily."29 The Court added t at a park owner 
could enforce reasonable rules concerning the typ and size of the 
signs, but an outright restriction on all signs would e unreasonable. 30 
While finding the restriction against "For Sale" sign to be in violation 
of the statute, the Court did sustain the park owner s use of a sign di-
recting potential buyers to first come to his office. Absent a scheme to 
prevent tenants from selling their homes, the Court found that the 
sign had a reasonable purpose, i.e., the provision of information con-
cerning the park's rules and regulations.31 
§2.6. State and Federal Legislation. While the 1976 Survey year 
saw increasing activity on the judicial front, the leliSlative arena was 
fairly quiet. The lack of any mc:tior activity, espe ially on the state 
level, can be accounted for in the following ways. F' rst, after years of 
high-pitched consumer activity in the Legislature, here now exists a 
feeling that consumer efforts should be focused 0 more and better 
enforcement of existing laws. Additionally, it is felt by many that the 
25Id. at 1085, 346 N.E.2d at 712. See Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1425, 1426 n.2, 1436-37 & n.9, 316 N.E.2d 748, 750 n.2, 756-57 & n.9, where the 
Court modified a decree concerning the resale of mobile homes. 
26 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1085-86,346 N.E.2d at 712. See C.L. c. 140, §§ 32J(2), 32L. 
27 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1085,346 N.E.2d at 712. j 
28Id. at 1087-88,346 N.E.2d at 713. 
29Id. 
30Id. at 1088,346 N.E.2d at 713. 
31Id. at 1088-89, 346 N.E.2d at 713. The Court refused to co sider the park owner's 
rule that "[m]anagement recognizes a tenant's right to sell his mo ile home on the lot, if 
current legislation is upheld in the Courts." [d. at 1089, 346 N .. 2d at 713. The Court 
found that in light of its decisions in Gustafsson and Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 1974 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1425, 316 N.E.2d 748, the issue had been resolved by the courts, 
thereby making consideration of the rule unnecessary. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1089, 
346 N.E.2d at 713-14. 
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broad application given by the courts to chapter 93A 1 adequately af-
fords remedies to an aggrieved consumer in practically any area of 
trade or commerce. Second, during almost all of the legislative session 
occurring during the Survey year, the General Court as well as the ex-
ecutive was preoccupied by the grave fiscal problems besetting the 
Commonwealth. It was not until late into the fall of 1975 that a 
budget for fiscal year 1976 was finally signed into law, accompanied 
by the largest single tax increase ever visited upon the citizens of the 
Commonwealth. 2 In such an environment, consumer problems were 
assigned secondary importance. Finally, national economic woes, in-
cluding inflation, recession, and high unemployment, spawned prob-
lems for business and industry in Massachusetts. As such, the creation 
of a better business environment in the state became a high priority of 
many government officials. Such a priority should not be construed to 
mean that progressive consumer legislation is antithetical to a good 
business climate, but rather, as was the case with state fiscal problems, 
consumer matters seem to have been relegated to the back burner. 
Despite these conditions, some legislation of importance to consumers 
was passed during the Survey year. 
I. FAIR TRADE LAW REPEAL 
The federal antitrust exemption that permitted states to enact fair 
trade laws was repealed by Public Law 94-145, a law signed by the 
President on December 12, 1975.3 The law became effective on March 
11, 1976, and at that time the Commonwealth's authority to enact and 
enforce such laws expired. The Commonwealth's Fair Trade Law, sec-
tions 14A through 14D of chapter 93 of the General Laws, permitted 
manufacturers, producers, and vendors to set and maintain retail 
prices for their commodities. The Fair Trade Law was dealt a crush-
ing blow by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1973, when it ruled that al-
though the nonsigner provision of section 14B did not violate the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, it 
did amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to 
private parties. 4 In effect, this meant that producers and vendors 
could only maintain resale prices in those instances where the retailer 
signed a contract agreeing to do so. In light of Public Law 94-145, it 
appears that such resale price maintenance contracts are no longer 
§2.6. 1 See, e.g., Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 322 
N.E.2d 768; Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1425, 316 N.E.2d 748. 
For a discussion of Slaney and DeCotis, see Willier, Consumer Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW § 9.1, at 165-71. 
2 See Acts of 1975, c. 684. 
3 Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975). 
4 Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 363 Mass. 409, 415-16, 424, 294 N.E.2d 
354,357-58,362-63 (1973). 
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valid, :;is they violate both state and federal antitrust aws. 5 
As of the end of the 1976 Survey year, sections 14 through 14D of 
chapter 93 remained in the statute books. Howeve , a bill to repeal 
the fair trade laws, introduced to eliminate any co fusion and in the 
interest of uniformity with applicable federal law, had passed the 
Massachusetts Senate and was before the House f Representatives 
Ways and Means Committee.6 
II. A DVERTISING OF 0 PHTHALMIC GOODS 
For many years, statutory and regulatory prohi ItlOns against the 
advertising of certain goods and services have been accepted as a ra-
tional exercise of the state's police power to pr mote the public 
health, safety, and welfare. 7 In recent years, howev r, such bans have 
come under increasing attack from both a legal and conomic point of 
view. Indeed, during this past term, the Unite States Supreme 
Court, in a landmark decision, Virginia State Board Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,8 held that stat bans prohibiting 
prescription drug price advertising violated the firs amendment, and 
in so doing, constituted a denial of the consumer's ri ht to know. 
Recognizing these judicial trends, as well as the act that the Mas-
sachusetts statute prohibiting advertising was und r attack in state 
court,9 the Legislature amended section 73A of c apter 112 of the 
General Laws. 10 The amendment effected a repeal of the traditional 
ban against advertising eyeglasses at fixed prices a d adopted a new 
law authorizing eyeglass advertising as long as suc advertising was 
not carried on in an unfair or deceptive mannerY s with the repeal 
of the fair trade laws, this action is expected to i crease consumer 
awareness of differing quality and prices, and rna e the ophthalmic 
goods and services market more competitive. 12 Futu e legislative activ-
ity seeking repeal of prohibitions against advertisin in other similar 
areas of commerce13 can be expected. 
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975); G.L. c. 93, §§ 2, 13. 
6 S. 97 (1976); H. 46 (1976). 
7 Flynn v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 320 Mass. 29, 3 , 67 N.E.2d 846, 850 
(1946); Commonwealth v. Ferris, 305 Mass. 233,235-38,25 N.E.2 378,380-82 (1940). 
8425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976). 
• Consumers' Council v. Board of Registration in Optometry, ivil No. 10715 (Suf-
folk Superior Ct.). In addition to challenging the statute, the suit Iso challenged Regu-
lation 9 of the Board of Registration in Optometry, which prohi its optometrists from 
advertising. 
10 Acts of 1976, c. 91. 
11 See Ul. 
12 See, e.g., STAH REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS ION, ADVERTISING OF 
OPHTHALMIC GOODS AND SERVICES, (January 1976). 
13 Among other statutes which restrict advertising are: G.L. c. 94C, § 46 (controlled 
substances); G.L. c. 112, §§ 19 (podiatrists), 52A & 52C (dentists, 84 (embalmers and 
funeral directors), 87K (barbers), 87KKK (electrologists), and 97 ( hiropracters). 
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III. REVOLVING CREDITAGREEMENT 
Chapter 116 of the Acts of 1976 has expanded the meaning of the 
term "signed by the buyer" as it is used in the definition of "revolving 
credit agreement" in section 1 of chapter 255D of the General Laws. 14 
An agreement "signed by the buyer," a concept previously undefined, 
is now construed to mean that an agreement is signed if after a re-
quest for an account (1) the agreement is in fact signed, (2) the card is 
used by the buyer, or (3) another person is authorized by the buyer to 
use it. The revolving credit agreement is also deemed to be signed if 
after receiving notice of a change in the terms of an established ac-
count pursuant to which a credit card was previously issued, the buyer 
or a person authorized by the buyer uses the card. 15 
IV. FAIR CREDIT BILLING: COMPLIANCE 
During the 1975 Suroey year, the United States Congress added 
chapter 4 (sections 1666-1666j), Credit Billing, to Title I of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act,16 which became effective October 28, 
1975.17 This law is quite similar to chapter 93C of the General Laws, 
but some differences do exist. IS Section 1666j preserves application of 
state law "except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with 
any provision of this chapter, and then only to the extent of the 
inconsistency. "19 
The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to determine the extent of 
the inconsistency of state laws.20 As noted in the 1975 Suroey, 21 the 
Board ruled that chapter 93C was preempted as it applied to any ini-
tial procedures that the customer and creditor must take with refer-
ence to correcting billing errors.22 However, confusion among cred-
itors prompted the filing of a bill to deem compliance with the federal 
law to be compliance for all purposes with chapter 93C.23 However, 
since consumer advocates apparently considered the Massachusetts 
law more desirable for consumers, there was an unwillingness to go 
along with such a condition. Therefore, a compromise was reached 
and signed into law. As a result, chapter 123 of the Acts of 1976, 
enacted with an emergency preamble, provides that until April 1, 
1977, compliance with the Fair Credit Billing Act will be deemed and 
14 Acts of 1976, c. 116, amending G.L. c. 255D, § 1. 
15Id. 
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970). 
17 Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 306 (Oct. 28, 1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-66j (Supp. 
V 1975». 
18 See Willier, Consumer Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.5, at 178-81. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 1666j(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
2°Id. 
21 See Willier, Consumer Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 9.5, at 178. 
22 12 C.F.R. § 266.6(b)(2)(i) (1976). 
23 H. 4527 (1976). 
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construed to be compliance for all purposes with the provisions of 
chapter 93C.24 The effect of this chapter is to rendet any violation of 
state law, which is not also a violation of the federall~w, unactionable. 
In the meantime, state and federal officials will be attempting to re-
solve the problems resulting from the inconsistencies r·n the two laws. 
v. CREDIT CARDS: DISCOUNT FOR CASH 
As a result of recent trends in consumer protection,25 the Legis-
lature amended chapter 140C of the GenJral Laws, the 
Commonwealth's Truth-in-Lending Act, to govern I those situations 
where a seller offers a discount for payment by cash rather than by 
use of an open-end credit account.26 The amendrrents to chapter 
140C provide that a discount for cash is not a fin~rce charge, pro-
vided: (1) the discount does not exceed five percent; (2) the discount 
is available to all prospective buyers; (3) the availability of the discount 
is clearly and conspicuously disclosed by a sign or qisplay at the en-
trance; and (4) if the fact that customers are allowe~j to pay by credit 
card is disclosed in any advertisement, the availabilIty of a discount 
for cash must also be clearly and conspicuously disclosed or, in any 
case, disclosed before the transaction has been compMted.27 
Other changes made by the 1975 amendments to thapter l40C in-
clude a four year limitation on a customer's right to rescind a credit 
transaction in which a security interest is created in tre principle resi-
dence of the customer.28 Under section 8(a) of cha9ter l40C, a cus-
24 Acts of 1976, c. 123. ~ 
25 Merchants who accept credit cards usually must pay a service charge of 2% to 8% 
of the sale price to the card issuer, an amount that does not have t be paid if the buyer 
uses cash. In the past credit card companies have stipulated that if a store accepts its 
credit card, the merchant cannot charge a lower price for cash customers to compensate 
for the service charge. This practice was challenged by the Consu~ers Union as illegal 
price fixing that prevented cash discounts and discriminated againrt cash customers. In 
an action brought by the Consumers Union in federal court, American Express Com-
pany agreed in a settlement to permit its retailers to offer discounts to cash customers. 
Blitz v. American Express Co., Civ. Action No. 74-314 (D.D.C. fled Feb. 20, 1974). 
This case is discussed at [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] CONSUMERIS (CCH) 656, 745-46. 
The Blitz. case has had a significant influence on recent federal an Massachusetts legis-
lation in this area. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra. 
28 Acts of 1975, c. 592, § 2. These amendments were enacted to conform with recent 
federal legislation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666f (Supp. V 1975). I 
27 Acts of 1975, c. 592, § 2. The section goes on to provide th~t either a surcharge 
added on to the price tag of an item if the buyer uses a credit card or a discount for 
cash in excess of 5% shall be considered as a finance charge. Id. 
Section 3 of chapter 592 provides that compliance with the provisions of the federal 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730f, 1831b, ~601 et seq. (Supp. V 
1975) (amended 1975), regulations issued thereunder, and the ~se of the combined 
Uniform Disclosure Settlement Statement form issued by the Secretary of HUD shall be 
deemed compliance with the disclosure requirements of G.L. c. 140C, § 5. Acts of 1975, 
c. 592, § 3. 
28 Acts of 1975, c. 592, § 8A, amending G.L. c. l40C, § 8(a). 
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tomer may rescind within three days following the later of the con-
summation of the transaction or the delivery by the creditor of the 
required disclosures. A problem had arisen under the prior version of 
section 8(a) as to when the customer's right to rescind expired if the 
creditor, although having consummated the transaction, never deliv-
ers the disclosures. In such a situation, the problem is created by the 
fact that the later of the two events necessary to toll the statute of 
limitations never occurs. Chapter 592 of the Acts of 1975 remedies 
this problem by establishing a statute of limitations of four years, 
which statutory period runs irrespective of whether or not the dis-
closures are ever delivered. 29 
Additional provisions have also been added to section 10 of the 
Truth-in-Lending Act, which section sets forth the penalties for viola-
tion of the Act. 30 The new provisions read: 
(e) No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply 
to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any 
rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by the commissioner, 
notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such 
rule, regulation or interpretation is amended, rescinded, or deter-
mined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason. 
(f) The multiple failure to disclose to any person any information 
required under this chapter to be disclosed in connection with a 
single account under an open end consumer credit plan, other 
single consumer credit sale, consumer loan, or other extension of 
consumer credit, shall entitle the person to a single recovery under 
this section but continued failure to disclose after a recovery has 
been granted shall give rise to rights to additional recoveries. 
(g) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any 
civil action for a violation of this chapter which may be brought 
against the original creditor in any credit transaction may be main-
tained against any subsequent assignee of the original creditor 
where the violation from which the alleged liability arose is appar-
ent on the face of the instrument assigned unless the assignment is 
involuntary.31 
29 Id. 
30 G.L. c. 140C, § 10, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 592, § II. 
31 Acts of 1975, c. 592, § II. 
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